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3 Keeping ‘Spies & Spooks’ on the 
Right Track: Ethics in the Post 9/11 
Intelligence Era
Monica den Boer1
‘I consider myself a moral person – at least I hope I am. But I lied, cheated, manipulated 
and deceived every day of my CIA career. I stole foreign countries’ secrets whenever I could 
and undermined unfriendly governments. I induced foreign officials to commit treason 
against their own countries. I saw and I exploited the dark side of human nature more 
often than I care to remember. I believed then and still do that all these actions were in the 
service of a noble cause – but no one could have had the kind of career I did without at least 
some second thoughts.’
(James M. Olson, Former Chief of CIA Counterintelligence, in Fair Play, 2006, p. 13)
Intelligence is a ‘ distasteful but vital necessity.’
(Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II)2
3.1 Introduction
The role of ethics in intelligence is the core subject of this chapter. Intelligence may be 
regarded as the discrete and often secret acquisition, processing, analysis and presenta-
tion of information by specialised organisations, including government organisations. 
This information is required by policymakers and executive administrations to protect 
or promote essential state functions, such as the protection of security, international 
relations and the management of prime economic and other interests. Intelligence as 
such can also be defined as a dynamic activity which is handled by a series of actors 
who collect, process, analyse and exploit information for several security purposes, 
such as the investigation of terrorism, radicalisation, subversion, industrial espionage 
and serious organised crime. Starting from the observation that the concept of in-
telligence is wide ranging, the discussion will focus on intelligence-handling by law 
enforcement agencies as well as intelligence agencies with internal and external policy 
1 Thanks to Emile Kolthoff who commented upon a previous draft, and to the anonymous reviewer for very 
useful comments. Omissions and mistakes are the sole responsibility of the author.
2 www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/our-first-
line-of-defense-presidential-reflections-on-us-intelligence/eisenhower.html.
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mandates. It is often presumed that although ethics is an important dimension in in-
telligence-handling, explanations or accountability concerning the methods by which 
intelligence is gathered and processed is scarce. However, several countries have an 
elaborate system for monitoring intelligence agencies.
The value attached to intelligence often depends on the political or economic situation. 
Generally, it is maintained that the more volatile and ambiguous the international 
context is, the more relevance intelligence may have in the prediction of strategies and 
moves by foreign armies, governments, businesses and opposition groups. In history 
and fiction books, one can find several illustrations of the significance of intelligence 
for governments in determining their political positions. The treacherous domain of 
covert or secret intelligence-gathering also inspires novelists. A recent example is the 
novel Winter in Madrid by C.J. Sansom,3 in which a traumatised former British soldier 
is sent to Spain to disentangle the complicated political situation in pre-Second World 
War Spain, which is devastated by civil war and torn apart by several political factions. 
Another example is the thrilling novel The Janissary Tree by Jason Goodwin,4 where 
the detective alias eunuch Yashim Togalu seeks to uncover a range of murders in the 
harems of an Ottoman palace, leading him onto a trail to the Janitsars. This is just an 
arbitrary selection of the wealth of literature that is inspired by the often murky world 
of ‘spies and spooks’.
Intelligence is expected to promote national and international security. If it fails to do 
so, its relevance may be played down but particularly the means and methods used 
for the collection of intelligence – disproportionate and privacy-invasive as they may 
be – will be subjected to more rigorous scrutiny. The flipside of this argument is that 
the tolerance of ‘amorality’ in intelligence processes may increase to prevent or curtail 
perceived security dangers (Drexel Godfrey, 2006, p. 5). This reasoning boils down to 
a utilitarian argument which advances teleological or goal-oriented thinking: that, in 
order to prevent grave harm, intelligence professionals must sometimes ‘deceive and 
harm’ in order to accomplish security: ‘The boundary for these activities lies in their 
purpose’, says Pfaff (2006, p. 67). In a modern day context, utilitarian thinkers like 
Bentham and Mill would probably argue that an act that contributes to the maximisa-
tion of happiness and security of the greatest number of citizens justifies the measure 
itself, whether or not it is a harsh one. Apart from the observation that this utilitarian 
card can be played repeatedly and on the occasion of each and every security incident 
that is defined as an attempt to undermine national security, there will be no recogni-
tion of basic principles such as human rights (Olson, 2006, p. 29).
In the post 9/11 era, the utilitarian argument has often been used by politicians, which 
has demonstrated that it has become more difficult to draw a clear line, given the 
3 Published by Pan MacMillan, 2006.
4 Published by Farra, Straus and Giroux, 2006.
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moral issues involved in the proportionality of surveillance measures, collateral dam-
age and civilian casualties (Pfaff, 2006, p. 68). Olson says aptly that in times of fear, 
Americans, for instance, have been willing to ‘tolerate intelligence activities they might 
otherwise abhor in ordinary times’ (2006, p. 39). But if one follows this line of reason-
ing, citizens will only be willing to accept intrusive or immoral intelligence measures 
if there is a genuine enemy who represents a great and imminent danger. At the other 
extreme end of the philosophical continuum, one meets the hard core Machiavelli, 
who emphasised intelligence collection and secrecy as necessary ingredients of waging 
war, and who admired states that were successful in using intelligence techniques in 
order to defeat their adversaries. According to Olson (2006, p. 24), we find in Machi-
avelli ‘an unbridled champion for even the most aggressive of intelligence techniques’.
The consequentialist school, on the other hand, takes into consideration the balance 
between means and ends; the ethical evaluation depends on the consequences of 
intelligence-handling processes. If these consequences are regarded as human rights 
infringements, they may be unacceptable; everything else may fall within the limits of 
acceptability (Born & Wills, 2007). In the ethics debate, the intelligence world often 
refers to the Just War theory, restyled as the ‘Just Intelligence’ theory, which recom-
mends a careful consideration of the target of the intelligence as well as the method by 
which the intelligence is collected. The ‘Just Intelligence theory’ advances that there 
may be situations which justify exceptions to normal ethical standards, and requires a 
just cause, high chances for success, proportional means, minimisation of damage to 
innocent individuals, and oversight (Posner, 2003). Walzer, who has been the concep-
tual mastermind behind this thinking, speaks of ‘emergency ethics’, arguing that in 
situations of supreme emergency, even strict rules ought to be set aside.5
Finally, there is the deontological ‘Kantian’ approach which rules that some activities 
can never be justified, the so-called categorical imperative: no derogation is possible 
from certain fundamental rights. In Europe, this ‘moral absolutism’ (Olson, 2006, 
p.  25) is translated in the form of so-called fundamental (non-derogable) rights. 
According to the European Convention on Human Rights, no derogation is permit-
ted to the right to life, and no-one is to be subjected to slavery, cruelty, inhuman or 
degrading treatment (Born & Leigh, 2005, p. 18).
The Kantian, deontological position is not written in stone. As we have seen, toler-
ance limits for unethical conduct by intelligence professionals have come under severe 
pressure since the tragic events of 9/11 that unleashed the so-called global war on ter-
rorism. There are certainly no fixed positions about what constitutes morally sound 
and morally bad intelligence, and it is hard to discern a bottom line in this discussion. 
Intelligence is booming business, and both the means and methods used to collect it 
are undergoing rapid change, as well as the organisation of intelligence collection and 
5 Discussed by Mertens and Goodwin, 2007, p. 37 and 38.
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the governance of oversight. We will seek to illustrate the shifting perspective by draw-
ing from the main findings of inquiries into the international intelligence-exchange 
on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (2002-2003). The inquiry reports reveal a 
range of controversial aspects, ethical challenges and value dilemmas to intelligence 
professionals, but also another layer, which is the instrumental exploitation of intel-
ligence by political authorities. The chapter ends with a normative section on possible 
remedies to keep intelligence ethics in good shape, both at the professional as well as 
at the organisational level.
3.2 ‘Good’Versus‘Bad’Intelligence
The moral judgement of ‘right versus might’ has been a Leitmotiv within Western 
political thought since Machiavelli. Taking this to the work floor, the practice of intel-
ligence ethics implies that professionals and their organisations that handle sensitive 
information form a constant moral reflection on the way in which information is 
gathered, processed and used (Block, 2008, p. 192). Intelligence officers ‘need to ad-
dress, individually and collectively, the issues of the ethics of their profession’.6 The 
shift to large-scale bulk use of surveillance technology has altered the work of many 
intelligence professionals. No longer are they involved in the physical world of human 
intelligence collection. In fact, many intelligence professionals may be ‘comfortably re-
moved from the manipulation of assets or the direct application of lethal force’ (Nolte, 
2007). The interval between the intelligence activity and the active undermining or 
dismantling of a terrorist used to be rather large, but with new technology, which al-
lows simultaneous smart gathering of intelligence with the use of lethal means, the 
interval has become minimised. These shifts, which are dealt with more elaborately 
later in this chapter, require an adjustment of ethical reflection on the outcome of 
intelligence performance (Verweij, Chapter 6).
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies often rely on codes of conduct that allow an 
assessment to be made of the integrity of instruments and methods. Those codes are 
however – unlike codes of legal ethics or police ethics – rarely disclosed to the public 
(Born & Wills, 2007). The capacity of intelligence agencies to be self-critical and 
reflexive may be limited because ‘compared with other public institutions intelligence 
is insulated from external criticism.’ (Herman, 2008, p. 333) Moreover, its ‘production 
processes have no clear yardsticks of efficiency (though close relationships with for-
eign opposite numbers sometimes provide very useful comparisons). Its organisational 
culture produces high morale, but with it the danger of collective self-satisfaction; the 
6 Nolte, W. (2007). Review of Just War in the Age of Terror, J.B. Elshtain. New York: Basic Books, 2003, and 
Ignatieff, M. (2004). The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in the Age of Terror, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
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feeling of being ‘special’ is liable to produce the ‘not invented here’ reactions to ideas 
from outside’ (Herman, 2008, p. 333). In other words, intelligence agencies are aware 
that they need to be on constant watch in order to avoid slipping into complacency.
The situational logic of everyday decision-making processes, including basic processes 
such as the wording and selection of information, demand refined reflections of the 
intelligence professional. Even the legal principles enshrined in intelligence laws may 
be insufficient to provide a conclusive answer in specific situations. Intelligence profes-
sionals often work in the in-between-world, the space beyond the law, where individ-
ual discretion is required (Born & Wills, 2007). Hence, there may be a considerable 
gap between the general codes and the nitty-gritty of intelligence-handling. Despite 
considerable professional awareness of the importance of integrity (Pekel, 2006), some 
maintain that intelligence professionals have no theoretical and ethical foundation to 
guide them through the decision-making process (e.g. Goldman, 2006, p. xiii).
Intelligence may also be qualified as ‘bad’ when it results from technical flaws in the 
acquisition, processing and presentation by the special investigation services; by the 
improper use of acquisition methods; by manipulation of the intelligence product (by 
the services or by the recipients); or by its lack of substance or erroneous or false con-
tent. Hence, the qualification ‘bad’ is not only normative but in fact also too wide and 
too ambiguous for the ethics debate. In the context of unethical intelligence practices, 
there is a general association with misrepresentation, the deliberate leakage of infor-
mation, manipulation, deception, coercion, politicisation (Johnson & Wirtz, 2006, 
p. 167f), bribery, theft, political and/or economic disruption, sabotage, torture and 
lethal force. Though there are standards of ethical conduct, it is often accepted that 
there may be situations which are exceptional, for instance in the event of an emer-
gency, immediate threat or imminent large-scale threats to citizens (Gates, 2006). 
Purposefully bad intelligence can have several effects: it may lead to an unnecessary 
infringement of individual privacy, but ultimately it may also lead to an ill-founded 
large-scale war. In several instances where there has been a public allegation of ‘bad’ 
intelligence, committees or inquiries have been created to reconstruct the truth and 
to explain to the public whether or not the intelligence was misleading (Lustgarten & 
Leigh, 1994).
The process of intelligence-gathering has also been subject to several highly politicised 
inquiries. Notably the performance of the intelligence agencies before and during the 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003 has been investigated in several countries, particularly 
those that engaged actively in military support, but also in countries where govern-
ments gave political support to the invasion. Crises in the professional capacity of 
intelligence services, as well as their credibility and legitimacy, may be instrumental in 
forming strategies to improve them and to further professionalise their processes (see 
analysis later in this chapter).
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3.3 IntelligenceTrendsafter9/11:BoomingBusiness
Over the past decade, and even before 9/11, powers and mandates to conduct intel-
ligence activities have expanded significantly expansion (Born & Wills, 2007). The 
mandate of intelligence services has been widened in an incremental fashion (Her-
man, 2008, p. 113; 349; Jäger & Daum, 2009): there has been a move from foreign 
policy (military, political, economic) and internal security intelligence (terrorism, sub-
version) to intelligence that covers the threat of serious and organised crime, narcotics 
trafficking, arms trafficking and trafficking in human beings (Born & Leigh, 2005, 
p. 16; Herman, 2008, p. 130; Olson, 2006, p. 9). The nexus between terrorism and or-
ganised crime remains the subject of a long-standing academic debate (Ridley, 2008, 
p. 139).
Nevertheless, the intelligence agenda has gradually widened. Herman (2008, p. 349) 
maintains that this is not simply due to the ending of the Cold War, but because of a 
diffusion of security threats (see Chapter 1 on the Shifting Security Paradigm). Rus-
sia continued to be regarded as a strategic nuclear power; other security threats which 
have come to the fore include a range of terrorist threats, weapons of mass destruction, 
ethno-national and religious conflicts, tribal confrontations, fragile states, conven-
tional arms transfers, the safety of extraterritorial peace missions, and mediation and 
conflict resolution. It is well known that some terrorist activities, for instance those of 
the former IRA, were financed partly by extortion and protection rackets. Similarly, 
as Herman (2008, p. 350; 379) claims, international narcotics trafficking has seri-
ous implications for foreign policy, and hence, intelligence activities of law enforce-
ment and internationally oriented intelligence agencies may merge, keeping in mind 
however that the objectives of organised criminals are considered to be very different 
from those of terrorist movements (Berdal & Serrano, 2002). Gregory (2008, p. 58) 
analyses the relationship between police and intelligence agencies regarding serious 
organised crime, and shows how the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Gov-
ernment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) produce intelligence, leading to 
the observation that ‘the intelligence services were helping with attempts to disrupt 
criminal organisations’, as well as providing ‘some specialist training in deep-cover 
surveillance and associated technology ...’
Post 9/11 has also been the era in which intelligence activities proliferated (Born & 
Wills, 2007). A growing number of agencies has appeared on the scene that handle 
intelligence in all kinds of domains, varying from public to private, national to inter-
national, from open source to secret, and from general to specific (think of the special 
investigation agencies like Social Intelligence and Investigation Office (SIOD) or the 
Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Office (FIOD in the Netherlands). The effect is 
that intelligence is subject to a vast increase in terms of volume, but at the same time it 
may lose its particular value and suffer from devaluation due to the open and intercon-
nected environment in which information is gathered and analysed.
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Intelligence has always been collected as part of warfare: spies, informers, scout-mas-
ters were sent into foreign lands to gather information about vulnerabilities, politi-
cal opposition, market opportunities (Herman, 2008, p. 9). Secret information has 
never been clearly separated from other kinds of government information (Herman, 
2008; 2010). Government authorities are both the requestors and recipients of sensi-
tive information. With this double role in hand, they are capable of prioritising the 
focus of intelligence-gathering, and of allocating budgetary resources for specific intel-
ligence purposes. Intelligence is thus closely related to governmental power (Herman, 
2008, p. 13).
From the perspective of governments, intelligence as a form of warfare is cheap com-
pared with material expenditure resources like a frigate (Herman, 2008, p. 38). On the 
other hand, however, intelligence-gathering capacity cannot be isolated from material 
resources (think of the surveillance capacity of aeroplanes and marine vessels). More-
over, intelligence budgets have increased significantly7, despite the fact that the Cold 
War is now well behind us (Johnson & Scheid, 1997; Herman, 2008, p. 347). For 
countries that have active international stances and relatively high foreign policy pres-
ence on the world stage, like the USA, the role of intelligence is still seen as important, 
given also its close relationship with military power (Herman, 2008, p. 345).
‘High policing strategies’ (Brodeur, 2007) have become part and parcel of regular 
police work and have become practices ingrained in ‘low policing strategies’. Bayley 
and Weisburd (2009, p. 82) define high policing as a practice that is highly different 
from standard practices of normal or low policing ‘because it is less transparent, less 
accountable and less careful with respect to human rights …’; ‘In general, high polic-
ing encourages a top-down command structure and changes the orientation of police 
from servicing to controlling the population’ (id., p. 82). Not only have law enforce-
ment agencies followed and further elaborated on the transnational networks of state 
intelligence agencies, ‘intelligence’ has also become a metaphor for ‘smart policing’ 
as well as for law enforcement processes that are guided by information. Many police 
forces have adopted the model of ‘intelligence-led policing’ (Den Boer, 2002; Har-
field, MacVean, Grieve & Phillips 2008; Ratcliffe, 2002). Intelligence seeks to reduce 
uncertainty by identifying patterns, and this helps to improve the prediction of crime 
and disorder which present themselves in a random way (Phillips, 2008, p. 26). Pre-
7 The US non-military intelligence budget totalled $49.8 billion in 2009, marking a $2 billion increase from 
the previous year. The US government is required by law to reveal its non-military intelligence budget, 
but the amount spent on military intelligence remains classified. Source: www.thaindian.com/newsportal/
world-news/us-non-military-intelligence-budget-totals-nearly-50-bn-in-2009_100268033.html. However, 
in September 2009, the US Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair, who is responsible for 
overseeing the 16 USA intelligence agencies with a total of 200,000 employees, was reported as saying that 
the annual expenditure for the total intelligence programme was 75 billion dollars. In 1994, the annual 
budget for intelligence activities totalled a ‘mere’ 24 billion dollars (source: www.intelligencenews.wordpress.
com/2009/09/18/01-245/).
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vention and anticipation have thus become leading principles of modern day polic-
ing. In this line, many police agencies have introduced changes in the era post 9/11, 
and have developed knowledge and intelligence capacity in areas such as response to 
weapons of mass destruction and risk assessment (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009, p. 87). 
As undercover policing or ‘special investigation methods’ have long since been pro-
moted and used with respect to organised crime and ideological crime (Hirsch Ballin, 
2007). Ethical questions thus loom large, as information about undercover or clandes-
tine intelligence activities that may prevent, undermine or interrupt a criminal act, is 
limited, and may therefore be difficult to control (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009, p. 94). 
Future research should look at ‘the degree of visibility required under law with respect 
to proactive counterterrorism actions.’ (Bayley & Weisburd (2009, p. 85).
Intelligence-led policing increasingly seeks to capitalise on so-called ‘community intel-
ligence’: information that resides within communities is being considered as a crucial 
element in the ‘signalling’ of crime, as well as in the prevention of radicalisation and 
terrorism. Community intelligence is to be collected by local law enforcement officials 
from the members of the community, who act as the ‘ears and eyes of the commu-
nity’ (MacVean, 2008, p. 70; Bayley & Weisburd, 2009, p. 91); neighbourhood police 
officers are (technically and formally) capacitated to take this intelligence through the 
hierarchy to a ‘need to know’ official (Gray & Slade, 2008, p. 515). Moreover, in an 
intelligence-led policing model there is a high tolerance of covert activities, such as 
technical surveillance, the deployment of informants, agents, undercover agents such 
as infiltrators, pseudo-companies, controlled delivery etcetera, which in many ways is 
the ‘police equivalent of espionage’ (Phillips, 2008, p. 30; Parlementaire Enquêtecom-
missie Opsporingsmethoden, 1996).
The merging or overlap between ‘high’ and ‘low’ intelligence activities may have its 
drawbacks, however. For one, according to Harfield et al. (2008, p. 3),
‘a situation has been created in which the expectations of “ intelligence” in policing are high; 
there are defined intelligence professionals who do not have control over the use of intel-
ligence but are likely to be singled out for criticism in identified intelligence failings at a 
time when public confidence in intelligence has been shaken; and a defined structure which 
includes “ intelligence” in its title but is in fact a business model used to direct activity to-
wards achieving performance management targets rather than necessarily responding to the 
prevailing crime and community safety environment. This context is the domestic policing 
and community safety equivalent of the “ fog of war” that so bedevils military intelligence.’
With Grieve (2008, p. 22), one could argue that ‘... intelligence is a system which oper-
ates in a non-linear world; there are a vast number of communications, interconnec-
tions, and multiple feedback operations.’ The challenge to design an effective, efficient 
and ethical oversight mechanism is thus formidable, given the fluid and heterogeneous 
character of intelligence and its high-trust environment.
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3.4 GoverningIntelligence
The institutionalisation of intelligence processes has been a continuous development. 
Governments organise their intelligence capacity in multifarious ways. Intelligence 
is generally not in the hands of sole assessors (Herman, 2008, p. 263) and is increas-
ingly handled by agencies other than just secret agencies: think also of other applica-
tions, such as ethics and journalism, competitive ethics (in business environments) 
etc., in view of tackling organised crime, drug-trafficking, extremism and radicali-
sation. Through enhanced interoperability, joint intelligence data bases and multi-
agency co-operation, one may witness eroding walls between the agencies. Hence, 
counter-terrorism strategies after 9/11 have reinforced the trend of inter-agency and 
multi-disciplinary intelligence activity (Brodeur, 2007; Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, 
p. 611; Grieve, 2008, p. 18). Moreover, the post 9/11 era has opened the door further 
for a blurring of former distinctions between military and non-military intelligence.
In the face of an increased sense of urgency and the need to step up international co-
operation, the tendency after 9/11 has been to transform the governance of counter-
terrorism efforts. Most visible is the move toward increased centralisation or central 
co-ordination of intelligence activities (Den Boer, 2002, p. 152; Lander, 2008), par-
ticularly in countries with a crowded security policy arena. In the Netherlands, for 
instance, 20 different organisations are involved in counter-terrorism activities, which 
has led to the creation of the National Co-ordinator on Terrorism (NCTb), June 
2005).8 In the UK, which has a longstanding history of counter-terrorism efforts, there 
is no single department that is responsible for the co-ordination of counter-terrorism 
activities. Like the Netherlands, the UK has a de-concentrated police system, and 
works using a similar co-ordination model in the format of the National Counter Ter-
rorism Security Office (NaCTSO),9 which is a police unit that works closely together 
with security teams. NaCTSO was initiated and is funded by the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO), assisting the government with protection and preparation 
against terrorist activities. One of its tasks is to co-ordinate security advice through a 
counter-terrorism security advisor (CTSA) and to build relationships between police, 
government and communities.
Moreover, since 2003, the UK has had a Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), 
which is the centre for the analysis and assessment of international terrorism. JTAC is 
8 Regeling van de Ministers van Justitie en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties van 29 juni 2005, 
nr DDS5357209, houdende instelling van de Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (Order from the 
Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs of 29 June 2005, no. DDS5357209, on the establishment of the Na-
tional Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism (NCTb)). The NCTb is responsible for the analysis of informa-
tion and intelligence, policy development, and the coordination of preventive counter-terrorism measures. 
(Website: www.nctb.nl/organisatie/wat_doet_de_NCTb)
9 www.natsco.gov.uk.
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based in the intelligence service MI5. It operates as an independent organisation and 
pulls together representatives from government departments and agencies. The Head 
of JTAC is responsible to the Director General of the Security Service.10 After 9/11, 
Former President Bush first created the White House Office of Homeland Security on 
October 8, 2001. After legislative amendments, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) became operational in the course of January 2003, integrating 22 different 
departmental agencies, including the US Customs and Border Agency, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the US Secret Service and the US Coast 
Guard.11 A restructuring exercise took place in 2005 aimed at spurring on operational 
co-ordination and efficiency, the centralisation and improvement of policy develop-
ment and co-ordination, as well as the strengthening of intelligence functions and 
information sharing.
Meanwhile, several administrations saw a need to install an intelligence ‘czar’, often offi-
cially labelled Director of National Intelligence. In the USA, the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI)12 has been functioning as the head of the intelligence community, 
and bears the responsibility for overseeing and directing the implementation of the 
National Intelligence Program. The office of the DNI integrates foreign, domestic and 
military intelligence for the purpose of protecting internal security interests and USA 
interests abroad. The DNI acts as the principal adviser to the President, the National 
Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related 
to national security. In a similar fashion, the European Union established the position 
of the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator after the train explosions in Madrid in 
March 2004 which left 200 people killed and more than 1,000 people injured.13 The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator works within the EU Council Secretariat and 
co-ordinates the work of the Council in the area of combating terrorism and keeps 
an overview of the relevant instruments. The EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator 
is not responsible for the co-operation between the national intelligence agencies of 
the Member States. This responsibility resides within the Member States, however, it 
should be acknowledged that the creation of the EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen)14 
and the counter-terrorism mandate of Europol15 imply the bundling and assessment of 
sensitive intelligence by EU agencies (Ridley, 2008; Van Buuren, 2009; see also Den 
Boer & Bruggeman Chapter 7).
10 www.mi5.gov.uk/output/joint-terrorism-anlysis-centre.html.
11 For more information, see www.dhs.gov.
12 www.dni.gov.
13 www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/79637.pdf.
14 This agency was set up to monitor foreign and security policy issues, such as weapons of mass destruction and 
proliferation. Since 1 February 2005, it also has a counter-terrorism remit. Moreover, it collects intelligence 
which is relevant to EU Missions. SitCen currently comprises over 100 staff members. For an appreciation of 
the governance of SitCen, see Jelle van Buuren at: www.burojansen.nl/pdf/SitCen2009.pdf.
15 www.europol.europa.eu.
Ethics and security_5.indd   66 23-7-2010   12:46:32
67
Finally, an illustration of increased centralised governance of intelligence is the crea-
tion of national counter-terrorism databases. In 2006, Germany created such a central 
database, making it possible to quickly locate information within police and intelli-
gence services on persons with connections to terrorism or extremism.16 This database 
interlinks several agencies, such as the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), the Fed-
eral Police Central Bureau (BPOLD), the Land Criminal Police Offices (LKA), the 
Federal and Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungs-
schutz), the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD), the Federal Intelligence 
Service (BND), and the Customs Criminological Office (ZKA). Meanwhile, in the 
USA, the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) has been set up, which is the mas-
ter terrorist watch list for all federal agencies. The National Counterterrorism Centre 
(NCTC) is reported to hold the classified reports of the 16 federal intelligence agen-
cies, which some view as the ‘mother of all terrorism databases’.17
At the same time, in several countries a significant impulse has been given to the ‘lat-
eral’ organisation of intelligence activity, with the intention to interconnect the intel-
ligence drawn from vertical channels. In tandem with the centralised co-ordination of 
intelligence activities, and in pursuit of the networked approach, there has also been 
a lot of ‘webbing’ of intelligence, particularly through the posting of liaison officers 
(Bigo, 2000; Block, 2008; Den Boer, 2005; Gill, 2006, p. 28; Grieve, 2008, p. 19; 
Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). A ‘world intelligence structure’ has 
emerged since the onset of the global war against drugs (Grieve, 2008, p. 19). ‘Decen-
tralisation’ and networked features may be hard to handle by law enforcement agen-
cies who generally work using a vertical organisation of their information-household, 
but it is generally understood that intelligence is purposefully fragmented and only 
selected elements of this intelligence find their way to computerised databases (Den 
Boer, 2002, p. 159). Gill (2006, p. 29) hits the nail right on the head when he argues 
that the mix of hierarchical-centralised governance of intelligence and the informal-
networked governance of intelligence has ‘significant implications for oversight’. In 
addition, Bayley and Weisburd (2009, p. 86) observe that those countries who have 
cultivated a decentralised counterterrorism structure, require those local or regional 
police units to undertake counterterrorism operations (e.g. compare the position of the 
Special Branch in all police county constabularies in the United Kingdom).
Similar tendencies in the direction of lateral intelligence exchange, for instance 
through counter-terrorism networks and liaison officers, can be seen in international 
contexts, transnational network structures such as the Police Working Group on Ter-
16 Act on Setting up a Standardised Central Counter-Terrorism Database of Police Authorities and Intelligence 
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rorism, the Club de Berne as well as the G6 (Gill, 2006, p. 41; Den Boer, Hillebrand 
& Noelke, 2008). Herman (2008, p. 350) argues that the international law enforce-
ment intelligence networks such as Interpol and Europol have followed older intel-
ligence: ‘its international networks are developing to cope with international crime on 
the same lines as the intelligence communities’ transnational co-operation evolved to 
meet the threats of Soviet military power and espionage and international terrorism.’
Within the European Union, new policy strategies have been announced with a view 
to improving the interoperability between the EU databases across the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice,18 including databases that contain fingerprints of asylum 
seekers, to customs information, visa records, and data that have been introduced into 
the Schengen Information System (SIS), which currently contains as many as many 
as 30 million records Europe-wide (Collett, 2009, p. 46). Originally, the intelligence 
services had to consult signatory parties to the SIS if they sought access to a so-called 
Article 99 alert for citizens who are subject to surveillance, but this restriction was 
removed in 2005 when the EU amended the SIS rules and removed the ‘prior consul-
tation requirement’ for intelligence agencies (Hayes, 2008). This case illustrates the 
fact that rules of authorisation and access have been flexed, as well as that the propor-
tionality principle (entry of these alerts only in cases of serious indications) is suffering 
from erosion. A similar observation applies to the access of security and intelligence 
services to the EU Visa Information System VIS and the EU Fingerprint System for 
Asylum Seekers, Eurodac.19
The intelligence community has never been homogeneous. The sensitive character of 
intelligence demands high levels of mutual trust between agencies, but even with-
in the agencies, a deliberate separation between intelligence activities is required. A 
‘disconnection’ or separation of intelligence analysis and those using the intelligence 
products intends to guarantee the integrity of each of the two processes. ‘When these 
roles become blurred it can distort the line between content and presentation and 
assessment and advocacy...’ (MacVean, 2008, p. 67).20 Hence, there are two opposing 
currents: the first one aims at interconnection of intelligence activity across different 
agencies, the second aims at the opposite, namely preservation of the sharp separation 
18 Stockholm Programme after JHA Council meeting 30 November and 1 December 2009, see www.se2009.
eu/polopoly_fs/1.26419!menu/standard/file/Klar_Stockholmsprogram.pdf, on p. 39.
19 Opinion of the EU Data Protection Supervisor, Brussels, 7 October 2009. See: www.edps.europa.eu/
EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2009/09-10-07_Access_Eurodac_
EN.pdf.
20 According to Olson (2006, p. 246), ‘compartmentation is the process of strictly limiting the number of 
people who are aware of a given intelligence operation. Some writers use the term ‘compartmentalization’ to 
describe this principle, but the correct term of art inside the US intelligence community is ‘compartmenta-
tion’. Only personnel with an absolute ‘need to know’ should be admitted into the compartment. Simply 
having the requisite clearance is not enough; the individual in question must have a legitimate work-related 
reason to know about the operation.’
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(‘firewall’) between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. At this point in time, 
we can only observe a pendulum between these movements.
Accountability for intelligence services is organised according to many different mod-
els (Born, Johnson & Leigh, 2005). In most systems, one will find a mixture or combi-
nation between parliamentary oversight and executive control. Norms and standards 
that apply are often derived from universal or international codes, such as the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. Each oversight actor has a different function in 
evaluating the work of intelligence agencies. Except for matters concerning internal 
and managerial control, citizens are entitled to submit complaints, media can expose 
misjudgements or scandals, and interest lobbies are in a position to present alternative 
views. Formal external control is exercised by the executive, the legislature (i.e. the 
parliament), the judiciary as well as international organisations (such as the European 
Court of Human Rights) (Born & Leigh, 2005, p. 15). Oversight authorities hold a 
key position when it concerns the monitoring of compliance with legal and procedural 
standards, however, their formal powers can never, by necessity, reach the full scope 
of intelligence ethics.
3.5 EthicalChallengesinaChangedIntelligenceEnvironment
In an emerging surveillance society which is strongly driven by the desire to con-
trol risk, fear and threat, the intelligence services are charged with a special respon-
sibility to guard the interests of citizens as well as equipped with intrusive means 
of intelligence-gathering. New technology, including DNA-analysis and biometrics, 
smart cards, RFIDs, and nanotechnology, make it possible for law enforcement and 
intelligence services to collect data on individuals and to build profiles, which hith-
erto would only have been gathered if there is an official suspicion. The intelligence 
environment is changing rapidly, driven by a mutual reinforcement between new tech-
nology, which facilitates anticipatory risk-prevention, and flexible legal definitions of 
terrorism and organised crime.
The first characteristic of the changed intelligence environment is that borders 
between institutions and databases have become more permeable and can now be 
transcended (Marx, 1998). Information that used to be inaccessible can now be more 
easily disclosed, aggregated, analysed and distributed. Information-gathering can be 
done remotely and anonymously, without the data-subject knowing or realising that 
a profile is being compiled about him. This may imply that the data-subject remains 
unaware and that he will not be asked – according to the classic data protection prin-
ciple – to give his explicit consent. Surveillance and intelligence-gathering will increas-
ingly be performed irrespective of what individual citizens prefer. The absence of a 
surveillance-contract may slip into a situational void in which a data-subject will no 
longer be able to exercise his rights. The question of choice, option or alternative for 
the individual will become paramount in the governance of the surveillance society. 
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Yet there are several contexts where ‘individual choice’ is a fiction, as is well illustrated 
by Marx (1998). The erosion of borders between law enforcement agencies and intel-
ligence agencies falls within this line. The removal of organisational barriers between 
agencies ‘has serious implications for privacy’ (Goold, 2007, p. 51).
The second characteristic of this change is that the current ‘anxiety society’ has 
become far more focused on the prevention of harm and risk (Aas, 2007, p. 13f; 
Boutellier, 2002; Ericson, 2007; Zedner, 2007, p. 259f). In this context, intelligence 
fulfils the role of a precautionary warning system (Herman, 2008, p. 384). Generally, 
information-gathering has moved from descriptive analysis to predictive analysis: the 
increased value of predicting the future through threat analysis and risk assessment. 
This requires intelligence professionals to look beyond the knowledge horizon and to 
make ‘intelligent’ appreciations on the basis of scant information; anticipatory intel-
ligence can also lead to decisions supporting pre-emptive wars. According to Herman 
(2008, p. 34), intelligence is about ‘forecasting’ and ‘prophecy’: the output of intel-
ligence in the form of assessments and forecasts is increasingly geared at supporting 
strategic, tactical and operational performance at all levels of law enforcement activity 
(id., p. 350). Preventive powers may have a very intrusive effect on people’s private 
lives and are unaccompanied by adequate control, this may lead to problems (Born 
& Leigh, 2005, p. 16). Closely connected with the use of the precautionary principle 
is the employment of sensitive (mostly pro-active and undercover) investigation tech-
niques, such using informants (Grieve, 2008, p. 19; Hoogenboom, Chapter 4), which 
is controversial from an accountability perspective.
The third characteristic is that data volumes are expanding. One could even argue 
that intelligence-gathering has never been so easy given the potential of new technolo-
gies ‘to reveal the unseen, unknown, forgotten or withheld’ (Marx, 1998). Recently 
adopted instruments such as the European Union Directive on the Retention of Tel-
ecommunication Data and the Passenger Name Records21 give law enforcement agen-
cies the opportunity to look into vast stocks of private data. With it comes a special 
responsibility to access to data; authorisation to enter, search or change data; inter-
agency exchange of data; verification procedures and so on. Particularly challenging is 
the ‘needle in the haystack’ problem where intelligence agencies can be blinded by the 
huge volumes of data (Adviescommissie Informatiestromen Veiligheid, 2007). Elec-
tronic surveillance, data warehousing and data-mining have become part and parcel 
of ordinary intelligence work.
21 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, 
pp. 54-63; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, ‘Transfer of Air Pas-
senger Name Record (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach’, Brussels, 16.12.2003 (COM (2003) 826 final).
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Issues emerging from these trends include the integrity of information and intelli-
gence. The integrity22 of intelligence is pivotal: information should not be leaked or 
sold illegally to interested parties in the full realisation that intelligence can have a 
transformative effect (e.g. in war situations) (Herman, 2008, p. 147). First, there is 
the issue of trust and consistency: are all agencies equally reliable and do they operate 
by the same standards? What about the transfer of the information between agencies? 
Second: can the intelligence be verified and validated? Are the sources on which the 
intelligence is based reliable and authentic? Can it be categorically ruled out that the 
intelligence that has been collected does not rest on coercive interrogation or that it 
was obtained by torture? Third, by means of which instruments was the intelligence 
generated? Did the subsidiarity principle prevail, which rules that secret or under-
cover techniques were used because there were no other means to obtain intelligence? 
Fourth, what was the consideration of the finality criterion, which lays down the norm 
that the intelligence is used for the purpose for which it was gathered? Fifth, what are 
the implications for individuals whose data was gathered and transferred to another 
agency?
3.6 IntelligenceanditsTransformativePotential
Governments are the primary consumers of information provided by intelligence serv-
ices. They base their decisions and policies on this information, making it paramount 
that the information is accurate and reliable. Hence, the general rule is that intel-
ligence which is provided to a government should not be subject to manipulation or 
exaggeration to fit institutional or political interests. As we have seen in several inquir-
ies about the intelligence that was gathered on Iraq, there has been ample discussion 
about the question of who was to be held chiefly responsible the intelligence-gathering 
process: Did the intelligence services themselves fail to make accurate assessments? 
Or was it the politicians who used the intelligence to build their case for the invasion 
in Iraq? Of crucial importance in the 2003 Iraq War was the sharing of information 
and intelligence with foreign intelligence services. Some information about Iraq was 
shared in a confidential manner, bilaterally between intelligence services as well as in 
the multilateral framework of NATO. Countries also share intelligence within frame-
works for the export and procurement control regimes like the Australia Group (AG), 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR).
22 The integrity of the intelligence product is a combination of different standards, namely: validity, credibility 
and ‘integre’, i.e. obtained in a rightful manner. Within the intelligence and security community ‘integrity 
of information’ means that the original format and content have not been changed (and cannot be changed 
by non-authorised actors).
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If intelligence services share information with other intelligence services, they are 
drawn into a responsibility complex for decisions taken on the basis of this informa-
tion. Before Iraq was invaded in March 2003 by a military alliance of the US, the UK, 
Australia, and Poland, and politically supported by a coalition of about 50 countries, 
several claims were raised by politicians like Colin Powell, and these claims were built 
on intelligence sources. One building block in the argumentation for going to war was 
the alleged connection between Saddam Hussein and Islamist fundamentalists (in 
particular Al Qaeda). One of the hijackers of the aeroplane that flew into the World 
Trade Center towers on the 11th of September 2001 was Mohammed Atta, who had 
allegedly been in touch with the Iraqi secret service, the Mukhbarat. These claims 
were raised in the media around 19 September 2001 and were confirmed by American 
government sources. There was to be an investigation, but the claims were never sub-
stantiated. The then Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Naji Sabri, and Saddam Hus-
sein wrote an open letter arguing that the American claim about the connection was 
meant to be a compensation for ‘old bills’.23 Another – retrospective – link between 
Hussein and Al Qaeda was made about Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a Libyan paramilitary 
trainer for Al Qaeda who died in a Libyan cell on 10 May 2009; he was interrogated 
by the American and Egyptian secret services and was said to have claimed (after 
 having been tortured) that there had been connections between Saddam Hussein and 
the transnational terrorist network of Al Qaeda. It is interesting to note that the claim 
about the link was not raised often in the public domain by politicians, although 
 initially it was posed as a hypothetical connection.24
Another persistent claim at the time was related to a secret informer with the code-
name ‘Curveball’, an Iraqi expert on biological weapons, who moved to Germany. He 
claimed that Iraq had sought to purchase large quantities of uranium (‘yellowcake’) 
in Niger; his claims were repeatedly referred to by former President Bush, despite vari-
ous doubts that had been raised about the credibility and reliability of this informer. 
Things were getting nasty by September 2004, when the press referred to claims made 
by Italian diplomats that the yellowcake deal had been fabricated by the French secret 
service, based on incorrect information from Libya, in an attempt to undermine an 
American secret service operation.25
In a report published by the British government on 24 September 2002, it was claimed 
that within 45 minutes Iraq could start an attack with chemical and biological weap-
ons. This report, entitled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: an Assessment of the 
23 www.nd.nl/artikelen/2001/september/19/kaper-had-contact-met-inlichtingendienst-irak-; www.refdag.nl/oud/ 
vp/010919vp02.html.
24 See e.g. Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende, Nieuwsbericht, 9 September 2002.
25 E.g.: Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, July 29, 2003, Niger-Iraq Uranium Reports Involve Ongoing Libyan 
Deception Ops.
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British Government’,26 included a foreword by then Prime Minister Blair, saying that 
‘In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq 
that ... Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability 
to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world.’ Furthermore, it 
was stated that ‘Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemi-
cal or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.’ Desmond Bowen, 
head of the Cabinet Office Defence Secretariat, had written a memorandum 13 days 
prior to the publication of this report to John Scarlett, head of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee, explaining that he had considerable doubts about the actual threat.27
In the years after the Iraq invasion, several questions were raised by members of the 
Dutch parliament about the intelligence that had been shared between the coalition 
partners in the framework of NATO, and the assessment of the Dutch government 
concerning ‘material breach’ by Saddam Hussein on the basis of intelligence that was 
made available by its two intelligence and security services. In a response, the Dutch 
government did not endorse the need to verify which foreign intelligence was used in 
the Dutch assessment of the threat of WMD.28 Several questions were raised after the 
publication of the British Butler Report,29 which claimed that intelligence about Iraq’s 
attempt to start nuclear and missile programmes had been scarce. The Butler report 
also concluded that intelligence claims concerning the production of biological weap-
ons in Iraq had not been accurate and that there had been no recent intelligence prov-
ing that Iraq had posed a more urgent and greater danger than some other countries 
which ran WMD programmes. Lord Butler concluded that the British September 
2002 report with the 45-minute claim did not take into consideration of the ‘thinness’ 
of the intelligence. Moreover, he concluded that there had been no effective applica-
tion of the normal verification procedures.
What was the situation in 2002 and 2003? The intelligence services were no doubt 
preoccupied with the global Jihadist struggle and had little capacity to take a critical 
stance vis-à-vis the intelligence that was produced by partner intelligence services.30 
In addition, partly due to the lack of an explicit mandate, partly because of the dif-
26 UK Joint Intelligence Committee, September 2002, www.number10.gov.uk/Page271.
27 13 March 2009, Nigel Morris, ‘Secret emails show Iraq dossier was sexed up. Intelligence chiefs criticized 
‘iffy drafting’ of key document.’ From: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/secret-emails-show-iraq-
dossier-uwasu-sexed-up-1643960.html.
28 www.minbzk.nl//onderwerpen/veiligheid/algemene/kamerstukken/11895/antwoorden-op_7e; www.minbzk.nl/ 
actueel/kamerstukken/11872/antwoorden-op_86.
29 See e.g questions raised in the Dutch parliament by Van Bommel (SP) and Koenders (PvdA), on 15 and 
16 July 2004 respectively (www.minbzk.nl//onderwerpen/veiligheid/algemene/kamerstukken/11872/ant-
woorden-op_86).
30 Response to parliamentary question about the annual report (2003) of the Dutch Intelligence and Security 
Agency (AIVD) concerning its foreign intelligence priorities: within the AIVD, there had been a ‘re-prioriti-
sation’ of intelligence-gathering with a focus on fighting Islamist terrorism (www.minbzk.nl//onderwerpen/
veiligheid/algemene/kamerstukken/12306/38-vragen-en).
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ficulty of running human informers in Iraq itself, human intelligence (HUMINT)31 
about the presence of WMDs or Saddam Hussein’s capacity for building a WMD 
programme had been scant to say the least. Several inquiries on the intelligence assess-
ment concerning the presence of WMD in Iraq have been undertaken since in the US, 
the UK, Australia, Israel and Germany.32
In the UK, several inquiries took place or are still in the process of being undertaken. 
The Iraq Communications Group (which was an interdepartmental steering group 
chaired by Alistair Campbell) disclosed a report entitled ‘Iraq – Its Infrastructure of 
Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’, which provided information about the 
resistance that weapons inspectors had encountered in Iraq.33 The first report after the 
Iraq war was published on 7 July 2003 by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee about the decision of the UK government to go to war.34 Many respond-
ents declined the invitation to give evidence to the Committee. It concluded that the 
intelligence on which the British government had based its decision were not original 
and mainly depended on information generated by technical means. Then, on 11 Sep-
tember 2003, there was a report (the Taylor Report) from the Intelligence and Security 
Committee, which is the oversight body of the British secret intelligence services.35 
This committee accepted ‘that there was convincing intelligence that Iraq had active 
chemical, biological and nuclear programmes and the capability to produce chemical 
and biological weapons.’ According to this Committee, Iraq was also continuing to 
develop ballistic missiles and underscored Iraq’s ability to operationalise chemical and 
biological weapons within 45 minutes. Hence the report backed the British govern-
ment with the claims it had made on the basis intelligence.
The Hutton Report was published on 28 January 2004 (entitled ‘Report of the Inquiry 
into the Circumstances surrounding the Death of Dr. David Kelly C.M.G.’), on the 
death of the UN weapons inspector in Iraq and adviser to the British Ministry of 
Defence. David Kelly had been found dead in July 2003 after it had been revealed that 
he was the anonymous source of a BBC documentary in which journalist Andrew Gil-
ligan had claimed that the British government had exaggerated the information about 
31 This despite the acknowledgement by USA authorities after 9/11 that the weakest link in the collection chain 
had been ‘HUMINT’ and that new case officers, assets, analysts, managers and translators were hired with 
an understanding of the languages and cultures of countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan (Johnson & 
Wirtz, 2004, p. 46; Russell in Johnson & Wirtz, 2004, p.150–151).
32 The Dutch Inquiry into the decision-making process on Iraq published an overview in appendix K, p. 505 
(Commissie van Onderzoek Besluitvorming Irak, 2010).
33 The report was discredited afterwards as it had been a compilation of information from undergraduate the-
ses: www.openheidoverirak.nu/?dataint#070703.
34 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq. Ninth Report of Ses-
sion 2002-2003, part I, London, the Stationary Office, 7 July 2003; also available at www.parliament.the-
stationary-office.co.uk/pa/cmselect/cmfaff/813/813.pdf.
35 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments, Sep-
tember 2003, www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/assets/publications/reports/isc/iwmdia.pdf.
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WMD in Iraq and the 45-minute claim. The Hutton Inquiry offered no conclusions 
about the quality, interpretation and presentation of British intelligence in the pre-war 
period. The previously mentioned Butler report, which was published on 14 July 2004, 
was however overtly critical of the intelligence assessments that had been made prior 
to the war in Iraq.36 On 15 June 2009, Prime Minister Brown launched an independ-
ent inquiry which has to analyse the dossier on Iraq from 2001 to 2009. The findings 
of the Iraq Inquiry, which is chaired by Sir John Chilcot, are expected in 2011.37
In Australia, two parliamentary inquiry reports were published in 2004. The first 
report was entitled ‘Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’.38 The second 
report, entitled ‘Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies’ (commit-
tee Flood), was published on 20 July 2004 and investigated the effectiveness of the 
Australian intelligence services, their task division and communication.39 A question 
which remained unanswered was whether the Australian government had adequately 
interpreted the information of the intelligence services. The report concluded that the 
intelligence of the relevant services about Iraq and MWD – in particular the Office 
of National Assessments (ONA) – was meagre, ambiguous and incomplete, which 
culminated in the verdict of the Committee Flood that the intelligence work had been 
an ‘intelligence failure of the coalition’.
The Danish Military Intelligence Service (DMIS)40 was reported41 as admitting that 
in a report on Iraq in 2003 it had not been right in concluding that Saddam Hussein 
had WMD. The assertion was made in a report of the Ministry of Defence to the 
 Danish parliament. The sources on which FE relied at the time were not only limited 
but also not very reliable. The HUMINT position was difficult and it had been hard 
to find Iraqis who were prepared to act as informers. Former Danish Prime Minis-
ter Rasmussen, who was appointed Secretary General of NATO on 1 August 2009, 
explained to the Danish parliament that it had not been the intelligence that led to the 
active military support of the Danes to the Iraq war (submarine and frigate), but the 
refusal of Saddam Hussein to give his full co-operation the UN WMD inspectors.42 
On 20 April 2004 the DMIS released documents. From a report dating from just 
before the war (15 March 2003), it appeared that the service had limited information 
36 Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Lon-




40 FE: Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste.
41 De Morgen, 4 November 2008: www.demorgen.be/dm/nl/990/Buitenland/article/detail/476623/2008/11/ 
04/Deense-inlichtingendienst-erkent-fouten-in-rapport-Iraakse-WMD-s.dhtml.
42 For the affair with former Major Frank Grevil, who is an expert on WMD, and who served a prison sentence 
after reporting to the press that he was disconcerted about Rasmussen’s exaggeration of the claim that Hus-
sein had WMD, see www.ifex.org/denmark/2006/05/01/two_journalists_indicted_for_reporting/.
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about Iraq’s operational WMD capacity.43 The service had claimed in March 2003 
that it possessed information that just before the war, Iraq had biological and chemi-
cal weapons. Following this affair, the Danish Minister of Defence, Jensby, resigned 
from his cabinet post on 23 April 2004.44 Spurred on by the outcome of the Australian 
inquiry regarding the intelligence failure, the Danish social-democrats demanded a 
further inquiry towards the end of October 2008 into the DMIS with a specific focus 
on the evaluation by DMIS of WMD.
The German Foreign Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst – BND) was 
claimed to have provided the American CIA with information on a regular basis (15 
times) about developments in Iraq.45 This was particularly controversial as Germany 
did not provide political support to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But with the backing 
of the then German government, the BND had stationed two liaison officers in Bagh-
dad, responsible for identifying non-targets (schools, embassies, hospitals) that should 
be avoided in a raid. They were allegedly also responsible for identifying so-called 
high-value targets. The officers were stationed in Iraq between 15 February and 17 
March and did not gather intelligence about WMD. There were also allegations of the 
stationing of a German intelligence officer in Qatar, in the office of General Tommy 
Franks, US Commander of Operation Iraqi Freedom.46 The information was given by 
an anonymous source from within the BND to the ARD. The parliamentary inquiry 
ended in inconclusive evidence.47
France did not support the war in Iraq and the performance of the intelligence serv-
ices during the war has not been subjected to an official inquiry or evaluation. The 
Direction Generale de la Securite Extérieure (DGSE) did not support the alarming 
assessments about the presence of WMD in Iraq. A year prior to the State of the Union 
address by US President Bush in 2003, the French intelligence services were reported 
to have communicated to the CIA that there was no evidence for the claim that Iraq 
had WMD. Yet, the chief of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspec-
tion Commission Blix reported to the Dutch Iraq Inquiry committee that Chirac 
had told him that intelligence services ‘had intoxicated one another’ (Commissie van 
Onderzoek Besluitvorming Irak, 2010, p. 285).
In the United States, several inquiries were launched in into the work of the intel-
ligence services. On 9 July 2004 the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
published a report about Iraqi WMD. Several shortcomings had been identified in 
the gathering and the analysis of the intelligence. This report was followed by the 
43 www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2004/04/20/1090731.htm; news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3639977.stm.
44 The Boston Globe, 24 April 2004.
45 According to Der Spiegel, 28 January 2006.
46 www.securityaffairs.org.
47 The Bundestag Inquiry started on 6 July 2007: www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse/ua/1_ua/auftrag/
auftrag_erweiter_eng.pdf. The report was published on 18 June 2009 (Bundestag1613400).
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Duelfer report on 30 September 2004,48 reporting the findings of the Iraq Survey 
Group (ISG) which had been installed by the US Ministry of Defence and the CIA. 
The ISG was composed of 1,400 American, British and Australian experts on WMD 
and their security personnel (Duelfer succeeded Kay at the beginning of 2004). The 
ISG found no proof of the presence of WMD in Iraq. Due to the UN inspections, Iraq 
had already been forced to terminate its weapons programmes. No proof was found of 
the existence of missiles either but the ISG found indications that Iraq had the inten-
tion to develop and produce long-distance missiles. In September 2006, the US Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence published the report ‘Postwar Findings about Iraq’s 
WMD and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments’.49 This 
committee was very critical about the accuracy of the findings of the American intel-
ligence services. On 25 May 2007, the same committee published a report entitled 
‘Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq’.50 This focused on the assessment 
of the consequences of the American invasion by intelligence agencies in the early 
months of 2003: the report concluded that the intelligence services had reported to 
the US government that a military intervention would have led to disastrous political, 
social and economic consequences in Iraq.
Dyzenhaus (2007, p. 148) claims that the reliance placed by governments on the pres-
ence of WMD in Iraq as a justification for invasion in Iraq ‘has done enormous dam-
age to public confidence not only in the reliability of intelligence information but also 
in the use to which such information is put by politicians.’ A supporter of Walzer’s 
line of thinking (‘Just War’; ‘Just Intelligence’) would argue that a politician is enti-
tled to get his hands dirty when moral and legal rules are broken for reasons of state 
(Mertens & Goodwin, 2007, p. 38). However, for ‘intelligence analysts and managers, 
politicisation is considered a mortal sin, a fundamental violation of their commit-
ment to provide policymakers with honest answers and estimates.’ (Johnson & Wirtz, 
2006, p. 167), but at the same time, ‘… too much analytical detachment or too little 
interaction between analysts and policymakers, ..., virtually guarantees that finished 
intelligence will fail to address the issues that fill policymakers’ in-boxes’ (id., p. 167).51
The discussion about the politicisation of intelligence about WMD in Iraq (id., 168) 
evokes the need for a balance between objective and actionable intelligence, as well as 
a need to identify the ethical dimensions that underlie the appreciation and exploita-
tion of intelligence. Moreover, various inquiries have demonstrated the need for an 
adaptation of intelligence oversight mechanisms, particularly in view of how intel-
ligence is gathered, how it is validated, to whom it is communicated, by whom it is 
48 www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html.
49 intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf.
50 Report of the Select Committee on Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq; intelligence.senate.
gov/prewar.pdf.
51 See also Chomeau and Rudolph, 2006.
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used, and for what kind of purposes it is used. Particularly in international context, 
and in order to avoid intelligence agencies ‘intoxicating’ each other, it is crucial for 
intelligence agencies to make sure that they avoid information loops and that they 
produce authentic and verified information. An ethics debate about intelligence could 
focus on the norm that politicians and governments, who are the principal users of the 
intelligence, should avoid exploitation and selection of intelligence that best fits their 
political strategy.
3.7 EthicalRemediesforIntelligence
Intelligence can be a matter of life and death. The accuracy of the intelligence product 
can thus be regarded as pivotal in the professional handling of information. In this 
sense, ethics is an essential dimension for any value-based security agency, be it a law 
enforcement agency or an intelligence service. Thus far, we have discussed the effects 
of a shifting security climate on security and intelligence agencies that have a mandate 
to collect intelligence. We have established that there has been a considerable exten-
sion of intelligence activity despite the fact that the Cold War is behind us. Partly due 
to emerging mass surveillance technologies, intelligence activities have been subject to 
proliferation, culminating in vast amounts of data available to the intelligence agen-
cies as well as leading to a crowded policy arena. This – relatively new – situation gives 
rise to territorial feuds between intelligence agencies. The competition is paralleled by 
increased multi-lateral and international intelligence exchange, blurring the original 
mandates and responsibilities. Moreover, the threshold has been lowered to include 
‘community intelligence’ in preventive strategies against terrorism, radicalisation and 
extremism.
Intelligence activities have grown in importance, particularly in the business of inter-
national police and judicial co-operation. This is the world where one encounters sharp 
differences between disclosure and data protection rules, as well as a differentiation 
between the demands for the tuning of ethical principles that underlie intelligence-
gathering processes, such as the running of informers and covert human intelligence 
sources (‘CHIPS’ in Block, 2008, p. 192f; Hoogenboom, Chapter 4). As intelligence 
exchange increasingly takes place in international contexts, there is an increased expo-
sure to surroundings that are rife with corruption (Block, 2008, p. 193). In this glo-
balised setting, new intelligence communities emerge that may inhibit a more trans-
boundary and networked character, making it more difficult to discern professional 
ownership over the intelligence product. Hence, the blurring of intelligence activities 
may imply serious consequences for ethics and accountability. When translated in 
research terms, there is a considerable need to map the consequences of this shifting 
security paradigm for the intelligence domain.
One of the leading questions is whether classical general ethical principles are still 
upheld by current intelligence agencies. According to Hulnick and Mattausch (2006, 
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p. 40f), the state must gather information openly if possible, and only use secret meth-
ods if necessary; the state should use the least intrusive means of collecting informa-
tion; intelligence should be presented to politicians and policy-makers without bias or 
political predisposition; and in order to prevent intelligence from being stolen, states 
ought to undertake adequate protection measures. Our discussion of the intelligence 
about Iraq has illustrated that there is a need to contemplate these classic principles 
again and to build a new culture of corporate reflection inside the intelligence agen-
cies, but also among the principal consumers of the intelligence, namely governments 
and state services that have a monopoly of violence.
This chapter has argued that ethical principles which are used by intelligence and 
security services should be made available in the public domain, and that these prin-
ciples should be made subject to a proper system of internal and external governance, 
through balanced oversight mechanisms as well as regular training and accountability. 
A range of professional and cultural organisational measures can be taken, including 
the encouragement of creativity, critical awareness, and professionalisation. Within 
intelligence agencies, detailed processes matter a great deal, and they relate to the 
minute details of drafting, reporting and decision-making on the basis thereof, as well 
as attention for the various phases and elements of the intelligence cycle (Gray and 
Slade, 2008). Organisational leadership coupled with professional ethics are regarded 
as strong and effective variables in the promotion of value-based security organisa-
tions; as such, ethical analysis should also be applied by those who conduct the surveil-
lance (Marx, 1998).
 An open and reflective culture within intelligence organisations should also welcome 
an evaluation of ‘unethical practices’. In many intelligence surroundings, it is no lux-
ury to promote a new ethics culture. Olson (2006, p. 14), who endorses ethics of 
intelligence awareness and training reminisces that ‘At no time in my CIA career did 
I receive training in ethics or morality.’ Johnson (2006, p. 266ff) advocates an ethics 
escalation ladder metaphor for weighing the use of specific interventions, such as cov-
ert operations, in which the subsidiarity, proportionality, expected effectiveness and 
intrusiveness are weighed against the importance of undermining the security risks. 
More emphasis can also be laid on the importance of output legitimacy, or the contri-
bution of the intelligence efforts to making societies safer. As argued above, internal 
and external oversight mechanisms remain an indispensable lever in the continuous 
promotion of an ethics-based intelligence culture: ‘No profession, particularly one 
that can hide behind a veil of secrecy, should police itself.’ (Olson, 2006, p. ix). In 
view of the rapid changes in the security landscape, there is a constant need to revisit 
the quality and authority of oversight mechanisms in national as well as international 
governance contexts.
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